LETTER: Animals deserve human(e) care
This letter was written in response to Mike Nabavian's recent article entitled "`Cuddly' Factor Influences How an Animal Is Treated" (March 17 Thresher ).
We would like to credit Mike for making a correct observation about our society. In society, animals are often treated based on the empathy and emotions that humans feel toward them -- emotions that are influenced by their "cuddly" factor. So according to this logic, a bunny rabbit would receive better treatment than a lizard. Mike seems to believe that because this is how our society currently is, this is the way it should be.
However, throughout our history, if our actions toward others had been solely determined by these ambiguous and often prejudicial standards, we would be left with a cruel, unjust society where many are unfairly oppressed.
Mike writes, "The fact is that most people empathize more with humans than with ferrets, more with ferrets than with wood lice, more with wood lice than with bacteria. Any principle that compels people to reorder these sympathies radically can be nothing but an invention, an alteration in our starting point meant to embody the personal preferences of animal rights activists."
However, 200 years ago, a similar argument could have been made about slaves. At that time, mainstream society's "sympathies and emotions" clearly did not lie with blacks.
According to Mike's argument, society would have no obligation to ever provide rights for blacks. Abolitionists' attempts to "reorder these sympathies radically" also could be seen as an "invention," an artificial alteration.
In short, Mike's argument produces a society where rules and morals are based only on prejudices and emotion, where exploitation and cruelty is allowed if it does not offend the sympathies of the mainstream. Clearly, these standards should not be used to dictate our interactions with other people if we are striving to achieve justice. Just as with slavery, Mike's standards when applied to animals foster a state where justice is obscured by societal conditioning and prejudice.
So what standards should be utilized? Contrary to Mike's argument, most animal rights activists do not base their ideology on the belief that other animals are equal to humans. The predominant argument for animal rights activists proceeds as follows.
First, it must be understood that the case for giving equal rights to humans is not based upon an inherent equality among humans. "The principle of the equality of human beings is not a description of an alleged actual equality among humans; it is a prescription of how we should treat human beings," according to prominent animal rights author Peter Singer in Animal Liberation . Humans are fundamentally unequal -- they have different intellectual capabilities, different artistic and athletic abilities, etc. According to the principle of equality, a normally functioning adult should not be given more consideration than a mentally handicapped person.
Furthermore, the principle of equality does not even demand we give identical rights to all human beings. Rather, it demands that we give equal consideration to their interests. Since different people have different needs and interests, different rights are sometimes in order.
For example, we may grant women abortion rights, but to do the same for men would obviously be ridiculous.
Equal consideration is the key even if it results in different sets of rights.
With this in mind, we can consider the case for animal rights. We showed earlier that the principle of equality for humans is not actually based upon any inherent equality among humans.
Yet there must be some similarity that causes us to give the same amount of consideration to a mentally disabled individual as we give to a college professor.
Yet the only similarities between the mentally handicapped and the college professor may well be that they both have the capacity to suffer and to experience happiness.
Although we are unsure of the intellectual or moral capacity a handicapped individual possesses, we still give equal consideration to them because of this capacity to feel.
With this in mind, the question becomes: Why do we deny animals this same consideration? Cows and chickens also have the capacity to feel suffering.
The only distinction to be made is that animals are not human. But we can no more deny animals rights because they are not humans than we can deny blacks rights because they are not white, or can deny women rights because they are not male. Some other distinction is necessary.
Yet no other distinction can be made.
Certain people with severely impaired intellectual and moral capacities may be closer in these capacities to other advanced animals, such as monkeys, than they are to normally functioning adults.
The only similarity between the three may well be the ability to feel suffering and joy.
It is this ability to feel that gives these beings interests, interests which we must consider.
As Jeremy Bentham writes, "A full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month, old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, can they reason? nor can they talk? but, can they suffer?"
Since no sweeping distinction can be made between animals and humans aside from species, animals should receive an equal amount of consideration.
This does not imply they should have exactly the same rights as humans.
Just as men do not need abortion rights, animals do not need voting rights.
But consideration implies that animals not be subject to undue, inflicted suffering.
These standards when applied consistently to humans and animals provide for a fair and just society, in that all humans and animals have an appropriate amount of consideration given to their interests.
Not only does this standard provide for a just society, but a compassionate one as well. In contrast, Mike's article provides for a standard within society where exploitation and prejudice can flourish, where fairness can be subjugated to the "prejudices and sympathies" of the mainstream.
Kanika Bahl
Baker '98
Mona Rashad
Baker '97
This item appeared in the Opinion section of the April 7, 1995 issue.
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